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MALTHUS AND THE COURT OF APPEALS: ANOTHER
FORMER CLERK LOOKS AT THE PROPOSED NINTH
CIRCUIT SPLIT
Aaron H. Caplan
Abstract: This Article argues that current proposals to split the Ninth Circuit are
unnecessary and would be detrimental to judges, law clerks, lawyers, and litigants. Larger
circuits offer various benefits, many of them arising from the diversity of cases and judicial
personalities on the bench. Splitting the Ninth Circuit would not bring the benefits
proponents predict.

Like Jennifer Spreng, I served as a law clerk to a Ninth Circuit judge.
But unlike her, I believe that for the foreseeable future, splitting the
Ninth Circuit is unnecessary and harmful. The arguments currently being
raised in support of splitting the Ninth Circuit resemble Thomas
Malthus's famous warning that the Earth's human population would
rapidly exceed the planet's carrying capacity, resulting in famine,
disease, war, and social chaos.' Malthus may have been correct that there
could come a point at which population will exceed resources, but he
was famously wrong about how soon that dreaded moment would arrive.
The same can be said for worries that an intermediate appellate court of
twenty-eight active judges is too big to serve the public interest.2
My experience as a law clerk to a Ninth Circuit judge3 leads me to
believe that for the foreseeable future, splitting the Ninth Circuit is
unnecessary and harmful. Jennifer Spreng's experience as a Ninth Circuit

I. Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the PrincipleofPopulation(1798).
2. Former Chief Judge James R. Browning observed the same syndrome, although it struck him
and others as a parallel to de Tocqueville rather than Malthus:
As the Ninth Circuit grew from 3 judges to 7, from 7 to 9, 9 to 13, 13 to 23, and 23 to 28, there
were those who were sure the court had reached the maximum practicable size before the new
judges arrived. In each case, that prediction turned out to be wrong. As Professor Wright said as
to similar remarks in the Second Circuit in 1950: "When we made those comments, we were
illustrating in striking fashion de Tocqueville's admonition against confusing the familiar with
the necessary."
Testimony ofFormer ChiefJudgeJames R. Browning to the Commission on StructuralAlternatives
for the Federal Courts of Appeals (visited July 26, 1998) <http:llapp.comm.uscourts.gov/
hearings/sanfran/0529BRO\V.htm>.
3. Law clerk to the Honorable Betty Fletcher, Aug. 1991-Aug. 1992.
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clerk leads her to the opposite conclusion.4 This difference of opinion
between two former law clerks demonstrates the limited value of
personal anecdotes for policymaking. Opposing anecdotes can always be
found, leaving decisionmakers at an impasse. Ties are best broken by
reference to objective data, if it is available in an intelligible form and
collected in a reliable manner.5 At the same time, statistics mean little if
they are not linked to a qualitative understanding of the world they
purport to describe. This makes it risky to ignore responsibly prepared
history, within which the anecdote has its place. In that spirit, this Article
offers my own anecdotes as counterpoint to Spreng's. The reader may
decide whose if any of them should affect the questions currently being
considered by the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal
Courts of Appeals (the Commission).6
Work of this sort is more subject than most to influence by conscious
or unconscious authorial bias, so a few initial disclosures are in order.
Along with two gifted and likable co-clerks, I worked in the chambers of
Judge Fletcher during 1991 and 1992. As a law student, I interviewed
with ten or so federal judges and their staffs (inside and outside the Ninth
Circuit), which revealed much about the differences in judges' work
habits. As a clerk, I read innumerable Ninth Circuit opinions in draft and
final form, followed the e-mail correspondence among the judges and

4. Compare my views with those of Jennifer E. Spreng, The Icebox Cometh: A FormerClerk's
View ofthe ProposedNinth CircuitSplit, 73 Wash. L. Rev. 875 (1998).
5. Even self-identified populists should not reject empirical studies out of hand simply because
they are empirical studies. See id. at 882 (suggesting that empirical surveys are something other than
"the evidence of our own eyes").
6. The Commission has received testimony on the subject of a Ninth Circuit split from judges,
attorneys, and scholars, most of which has been posted on the Commission's website,
<http://app.comm.uscourts.gov>. As this Article went to press in October 1998, the Commission
released a tentative draft version of its report to Congress. See Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Tentative Draft Report (Oct. 1998) (visited Oct. 10,
1998) <http:llapp.comm.uscourts.govlreportappstrue.pdf>. The Commission appears to have
accepted the Malthusian thesis, and it has identified the number of judges it considers the maximum
for an optimally effective court of appeals: 17 (with a strong preference for fewer). Id. at 27, 66. The
Commission's draft does not explain why 17 is the magic number, but it may have been derived
from the Commission's national survey of federal judges, in which 72.3% expressed the opinion that
the maximum functional court size is between 10 and 18 members. Id. at 27 n.66. Some 22% of
surveyed judges selected a higher maximum number or rejected the concept of a Malthusian limit
altogether. Id. This segment presumably includes the large majority of judges in the Ninth Circuit
who testified against a circuit split-and who are (not at all coincidentally) the judges within the
survey who have actually served on a noticeably larger circuit. For the reasons explained in the
body of this Article, I believe Congress should view the Malthusian portion of the Commission's
report critically.

Malthus and the Ninth Circuit
attended monthly brown bag lunches with judges visiting from other
cities. Although this Article is advertised as a clerk's eye view, my
opinions have unavoidably been affected by my subsequent experiences
as a litigator for Perkins Coie, a large general practice firm based in
Seattle, where I have advised or represented clients with legal questions
arising in all the states of the proposed northwest circuit. I have also
worked on a handful of cases before the Ninth Circuit, including death
penalty cases. 7
A few other disclaimers are useful to compare fairly Spreng's
clerkship experiences with my own. First, I clerked during 1991 and
1992, Spreng during 1996 and 1997. All but three of the active and
senior judges on the court during her term were on the bench during
mine, so for the most part we observed the same people at work. During
my year, however, all the authorized active judgeships were filled,
whereas by Spreng's year, as few as eighteen active judges on the court
struggled to do the work of twenty-eight.' To the extent Spreng observed
problems on the court that I did not, they likely resulted from the circuit
having too few judges rather than too many. For example, I saw nothing
that I would have termed an ongoing "collegiality problem," but years of
chronic overwork may have shortened tempers in moments of stress. I
saw very few judges sitting by designation from other circuits that could
have contributed to a "reckonability problem," but this is now a regular
method to fill temporarily an empty seat on a panel. Both problems
would be alleviated by untying the tourniquet squeezing shut the stream
ofjudicial appointments.
Second, judges have great freedom in how they structure their
chambers and assign work to their clerks. Some judges involve their
clerks in reviewing en banc calls or motions calendars, while others do
not. Some let their clerks read most of the judicial e-mail, while others
do not. The judge's enormous discretion in setting up chambers might
create very different clerk's eye views of the circuit as a whole.
Spreng allocates to me the burden of justifying the maintenance of the
current Ninth Circuit,9 and Part I of this Article challenges her reasons

7. Shortly after writing this Article, I joined the staff of the American Civil Liberties Union of
Washington (ACLU-WA). The ACLU-WA has taken no position on a Ninth Circuit split. The views
expressed here are my own and might not be shared by any of my current or former employers.
8. See Roster of Judges, 967 F.2d XII-XIII; Roster of Judges, 117 F.3d XII-XIII.
9. Spreng, supra note 4, at 88 1.
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for doing so. Parts II and III take up that burden, with Part IV offering
some concluding thoughts.
I.

ALLOCATING THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION

As a general proposition, I disagree that proponents of the status quo
must prove its superiority to a proposed novelty. Congress and the
Commission may not face any formally enunciated burden of persuasion
in evaluating proposals for change, but they do face the law of inertia and
the traditions of parliamentary procedure. Like most sane people do
when conducting their daily affairs, legislators satisfy themselves that
change will be not just equal to the status quo, but in some way better.
Spreng argues that even if the policy arguments for and against a circuit
split were of equal weight, popular opinion would tip the balance:
[T]he United States is a democracy. If the people of several
northwestern states want a separate circuit, that support states a
prima facie case in favor of a split. It does not matter if their
reasons seem "silly."' 0
Majoritarian arguments like these should be used sparingly when they
are directed to the federal courts. To begin with, the United States is not
a democracy but a representative democracy where legislators are
expected to exercise judgment, not simply wield the rubber stamp. The
United States is also a representative democracy with an independent
Article III judiciary responsible for enforcing the least democratic and
least majoritarian portion of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights.
I also question the factual premise for allocating away the burden of
persuasion: that the public at large actually cares about the issue. To be
sure, some senators have formed opinions on the subject, but I see little
evidence that many of their constituents have." With the exception of the

10. Id.
11. Id. (asserting that interest of senators proposing split "probably reflects the views of a majority
of their constituents"). Spreng also asserts that "the elected representatives" of the northwest support
the split, when only a subset of them do. Id. Elected officials from the northwest who have publicly
opposed a circuit split include Washington Governor Gary Locke, Washington Senator Patty
Murray, and former Montana Supreme Court Justice John C. Sheehy. See 141 Cong. Rec. S 10,436
(daily ed. July 20, 1995) (statement of Sen. Murray); Testimony of Washington Governor Gary
Locke Before the Commission on StructuralAlternatives for the FederalCourts of Appeals (visited
July 7, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/seattle/0527LOCKhtm>; Testimony of John
C. Sheehy Before the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals
(visited July 7, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/seattle/0527SHEE.htm>.

Malthus and the Ninth Circuit
occasional high profile case, the actions of judges are rarely the topic of
water cooler conversation. Judicial administration-as opposed to
judicial decisions in individual cases-is discussed even less, even at law
firm water coolers. My hunch is that if asked, most residents of Ninth
Circuit states would have no opinion about a circuit split, and a large
portion of those expressing views one way or the other would be making
up an answer to please the interviewer.
Spreng supports her belief that the public wants to split the Ninth
Circuit largely on anecdotes about the reaction of some Alaskans to the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Districtv.
Native Village of Venetie. t2 I say "some Alaskans" because at least one
group of Alaskans thought this decision was absolutely correct: the
winners. But let us accept Spreng's assumption that a majority of
Alaskans disagreed with the decision. Would this mean that a majority
of Alaskans agree with the views expressed by the editorial writer from
the Fairbanks Daily News-Miner,3 that the panel of Ninth Circuit
judges deciding the case misinterpreted the law because they reside out
of state? 4
It is a common reaction, upon hearing a judicial result with which one
disagrees, to criticize the decisionmaker for whatever reasons come to
mind. Think of the explanations advanced in newspapers, ballparks, and
taverns around the country as to why the juries in the first Rodney King
trial, O.J. Simpson's criminal trial, or the McDonald's hot coffee trial did
what they did. They were starstruck. They were racist. They hated
corporations. They hated the police. They loved the police. They wanted
to go home. They were just plain stupid. Some of these explanations
might be wholly or partially correct, but their truth, if any, requires more
than that the explanations sound plausible at first hearing or that they
have been advanced by one or more observers. Explaining the Ninth
Circuit's Venetie decision by reference to the judges' out-of-state
residence falls into the same pattern. Indeed, if Spreng were correct that
12. 101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 948 (1998).
13. Twelfth Court Warranted, Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, July 15, 1997, at A-4 (quoted in
Spreng, supra note 4, at 934).
14. The panel consisting of Judges Dorothy W. Nelson (author of the majority opinion), James R.
Browning (concurring), and Ferdinand F. Fernandez (concurring separately) is not strictly speaking a
Californian one. Venette, 101 F.3d at 1289. Judge Browning was born and educated in Montana, and
he established his chambers in San Francisco only because court rules in effect at the time of his
1961 nomination required him to do so. The Federal Reporter for many years listed him as the judge
from Great Falls, Montana, a listing that did not cease until the publication of 658 F.2d in 1981.
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the people of Alaska believe it is fundamentally wrong for non-Alaskans
to interpret the law in Alaskan cases, then the same objections should
have been raised when the case went to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
has never contained a single Alaskan, and has not had a Pacific
Northwesterner since William 0. Douglas retired. But the legitimacy of
the non-Alaskan Supreme Court appears not to have been questioned
when it issued its more likable decision. 5
The Alaskans who disagreed with the Venetie panel would not have
been any happier if the judges had been drawn from Seattle, Portland,
Boise, or Billings-or even Alaska. Consider the tale of U.S. District
Court Judge George Boldt, who ruled in 1974 that native tribes had a
right under federal treaty to harvest half the salmon caught in Puget
Sound. 6 Some of the Washingtonians who disagreed with his decision
created a tremendous uproar, and as usual the enmity was directed at the
decisionmaker. Judge Boldt was burned in effigy, 7 and the ruling
became known not under its captioned name, United States v.
Washington, but simply as "the Boldt decision."'" Alas for his detractors,
Judge Boldt could not be criticized for foreignness: the unpopular judge
sat in the Western District of Washington. 9 Nor could circuit court size
or panel dynamics be to blame: in the district court, judges sit in panels
of one. When the tribes sought a similar entitlement to a portion of the
Puget Sound shellfish harvest in 1989, the litigation was popularly
'' °
known as "Boldt II.
2 The case was tried to U.S. District Judge Edward
Rafeedie of the Central District of California, who sat by designation.'
When the decision arrived, at least one critic seized the available cudgel
of Judge Rafeedie's visitor status, and complained that the decision
resulted from "a Looney Toon judge in Los Angeles who has no

15. See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S.Ct. 948 (1998).
16. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th
Cir. 1975), aff'd, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
17. See, e.g., Bob Baum, Northwest's Indians Battling to Rescue TheirSacred Salmon, Chi. Trib.
(evening ed.), Jan. 16, 1997, at 8.
18. Phil Katzen & Riyaz Kanji, Post-Boldt: Tribal Rights to HarvestShellfish, Wash. St. B. News,
July 1998, at 16, 16.
19. See Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312.
20. See, e.g., Jim Klahn, 'BoldtI' May Decide Indians' Right to Shellfish Harvest, Morning
News Trib. (Tacoma, Wash.), Apr. 3, 1994, at B7, available in 1994 WL 4628894.
21. See United States v. Washington, 873 F. Supp. 1422 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd, 135 F.3d 618
(9th Cir. 1998).

Malthus and the Ninth Circuit
understanding of the impact. He hops on ajet to come up here for a quick
tour and walks away. '
Spreng may have a point about the importance of the public's
acceptance of judicial decisions. Procedural due process cases recognize
that respect for the rule of law is best cultivated when the government
acts in a manner "generating the feeling, so important to a popular
government, that justice has been done." 3 To the extent litigants believe
that appellate judges from their home states are more likely to do justice
than appellate judges from other states, they may be more willing to
swallow the bitter medicine of a loss when it is delivered by a local. But I
disagree that litigants believe this. As an attorney, I have never had
clients express a preference for appellate judges who reside locally.
Instead, they have expressed a preference for judges likely to rule in their
favor. These are not the same thing.
Attorneys counsel their clients that the best way to obtain a good
outcome is to have the facts and the law on their side. Beyond that,
litigants understandably hope for a judge who brings to the bench some
extra reasons for seeing things their way. This makes the litigant's first
preference the judge who is a blood relative or who owes the litigant
money. Sadly, these judges are recused, and the appeal will be decided
by strangers. The next preference among the strangers is for judges
whose track record of published opinions implies a judicial philosophy
favorable to the litigant's position. 24 For this reason, the Ninth Circuitlike all circuits-requires that briefs be submitted before the panels are
disclosed,' so that litigants cannot butter up a particular panel by heavily
citing panel members' own opinions. The next preference is for judges
who are smart and fair. (Since most litigants are convinced of the
wisdom and justice of their position, they assume that wise and just
judges will be convinced too.) The final preference is for judges who
22. Adele Ferguson, Clam War Peace Strewn with Mines, Bainbridge Rev. (Wash.), Dec. 28,
1994. at A7 (quoting.Jim Johnson).
23. Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) (Frankfiurter, J., concurring);
accordMarshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259-62,
266-67 (1978).
24. Strictly speaking, a litigant hopes for a judge who has ruled favorably in cases directly on
point (with the corollary that no litigant hopes for a judge who has ruled adversely in such cases).
But if the earlier case is truly on all fours, it becomes binding precedent to be applied as a matter of
law by all judges. It is for this reason I speak of "judicial philosophy," intending it to mean the
general pattern (if any) formed by ajudge's decisions in analogous but not dispositive cases.
25. See Fed. R. App..P. 31(a) (setting briefing schedule); 9th Cir. R. E(3) (disclosing panel
members).
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have at least heard cases arising from the same industry. The hope is that
even if the panel is dumb and partial instead of smart and fair, at least
they will have seen in some other case how the law is supposed to work
in the industry and may have learned something from the experience
despite themselves. For example, a given judge in an "Icebox" Twelfth
Circuit would be more likely to have heard cases involving North Pacific
salmon generally than would a given judge in the larger Ninth Circuit.26
Here, at the very bottom of the ladder of client preference, is a judicial
characteristic that might correlate with local residence. But not
necessarily. Familiarity with an industry does not ensure that the judge
will share your view of the industry, rather than your opponent's. One's
opponent is no doubt equally familiar with the territory, but horribly
wrong on the merits. Because opposing parties from the same area will
disagree with each other, Spreng errs when she refers to the view of
"average Alaskans" as if there were only one.27
Also troubling is the unstated assumption that a judiciary prone to side
with the local party (or the local majority) is a better judiciary, with its
corollary that we should structure the courts of appeals to facilitate as
much localism as possible. The framers provided for an independent
judiciary to avoid just such tendencies, and the Ninth Circuit has gone on
record as an institution that rejects appeals to presumed regional bias.2"
My experience corroborates their statement. During my clerkship year, a
panel was asked to consider whether a request for attorney's fees in a
bankruptcy case had been properly denied. The attorney, who lived in the
midwest and not in the Ninth Circuit, evidently felt that the only reason
he could have lost below was that he had been home-towned by those
crazy west coast bankruptcy judges. He was not going to let it happen
again. His first priority at oral argument was to seize the home court
advantage, explaining to the judges the many and deep connections he
had to their states. He went on for nearly two minutes about his service at
a navy base in Washington state, his daughter's rewarding college

26. The record and the briefs should fulfill this educational role for judges new to the topic. Even
so, the possibility that local appellate judges might be exposed to helpful evidence outside the record
is another argument, albeit an illegitimate one, in favor of preferring local judges. I have never heard
a litigant express this hope, which makes sense given that local appellate judges might be exposed to
harmful evidence outside the record as well.
27. See Spreng, supranote 4, at 933.
28. Office of the Circuit Executive for the U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit, Position Paper in
Opposition to S. 956, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995, 141 Cong. Rec.
S 10,436, at S10,438 (daily ed. July 20, 1995).

Malthus and the Ninth Circuit
experiences in Los Angeles, and his many fond memories from family
vacations to San Francisco. The panel was visibly embarrassed and
insulted by the attorney's assumption that they were geographically
biased. A panel member finally cut him off and suggested he begin
addressing the merits. The panel ultimately ruled in the attorney's favor,
despite his gaffe and his out-of-circuit address.
It is at best debatable whether there exists a groundswell of popular
dissatisfaction with the current size of the Ninth Circuit. Thus, public
opinion cannot be the basis for shifting the burden of persuasion from the
supporters of a split to the supporters of the status quo.
II.

A BIGGER CIRCUIT IS BETTER

A.

Fewer CircuitsMean Fewer CircuitSplits

This Part offers reasons why all things being equal, bigger circuits are
better. In a perfect world there would be no intermediate courts of
appeals. Indeed, in the founders' day, there were thirteen trial courts and
a six-member Supreme Court.29 This structure accommodated at least
two interests: (1) it provided an appeal to correct erroneous decisions, 0
and (2) it provided uniformity of decision from a single court of last
resort. The intermediate courts of appeals were created when the
population and case load of the country had grown to the point where the
mere mortals on the Supreme Court could not hear every appeal.
Through a series of enactments, the U.S. Court of Appeals was created to
address the appellate function for all cases, with the Supreme Court
gradually limiting its docket to those cases where a decision might
enhance nationwide uniformity.3' Thus, arranging the court of appeals
into multiple separate circuits arose not because of any intrinsic benefit
of such a system, but as a concession to human and technological
limitations. Among the human barriers was the limit on the number of
cases a judge could comprehend and rule upon in a reasonable amount of

29. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73.
30. To date, there has not been any recognition of a federal constitutional right to an appeal,
although the Supreme Court has ruled that where an appeal is offered, it must comport with due
process. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
31. See A Brief History of Ninth Circuit Courts (visited July 26, 1998) <http://www.
ce9.uscourts.gov/%veb/sdocume ... 0alfO94c8688256453007cbf349>; Establishing a Federal Court
System (visited July 26, 1998) <http:lvww.ce9.uscourts.gov/veb/sdocume...3b51albfbl88
256453007a91 le?>.
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time. Among the technological barriers were the difficulties in
transporting judges or counsel over large distances, and the absence of
communications technologies that could substitute for such travel.3" At
best, then, multiple circuits within an intermediate court of appeals are a
necessary evil.
The greatest danger posed by multiple circuits is a lack of uniformity
in the law. Under the federalist model, states may experiment as "little
laboratories of democracy" with different statutes, common law, and
administrative policies. The federal courts, by contrast, should not. It is
quite different for Maine and Florida to enact materially differing rules
than to have the First and Eleventh Circuits reach materially differing
interpretations of a single federal statute that applies to residents of both
Maine and Florida. If such a circuit split is not resolved, the federal
courts taken as a whole have committed the moral equivalent of an equal
protection violation.
Even if the new Twelfth Circuit were to adopt pre-split Ninth Circuit
law as binding precedent, statutes enacted or legal doctrines developed
post-split would eventually result in different rules of law. The job of
maintaining uniform case law along the west coast would simply be
kicked upstairs from the Ninth and Twelfth Circuits to the Supreme
Court (if it chose to undertake the task).33 Spreng may argue that since
we are at present stuck with multiple circuit courts, adding one more
would not be the end of the world.34 One of her arguments in favor of an
Icebox Circuit split, however, is the ease with which it would permit
32. While I disagree with judicial Malthusians that the Ninth Circuit is near the limit on the
number ofjudges per circuit, I have sympathy for those who argue that we are at or near the limit on
the number of cases a given judge (or panel of three judges) can decide responsibly. The limit may
be further away than we think, however. Just as new agricultural technology increased the carrying
capacity of the earth in ways Malthus could not imagine, new technology may continue to increase
the carrying capacity of each judge. Past technologies that have done this include the triage of cases
by staff attomeys who refer the simplest cases to screening panels; the bench memo pool that allows
judges on a panel to share the research of law clerks in other chambers; time limits on oral argument;
grouping related cases on a single calendar; writing shorter, unpublished memorandum decisions for
cases that break no new ground; and the general increases in office productivity that come from word
processing and e-mail. Other currently undeveloped technologies-such as video conferencing,
electronic transmission of district court records, or oral rendering of appellate decisions-may
increase the case per judge ratio even further.
33. Under its certiorari jurisdiction, the Supreme Court can opt not to resolve a circuit split and
need not explain its reasons. See, e.g., Beaulieu v. United States, 497 U.S. 1038 (1990) (White, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (decrying Court's failure to accept review of some 48
"sufficiently crystallized" inter-circuit conflicts during term).
34. Spreng, supranote 4, at 945.

Malthus and the Ninth Circuit
further division of the remaining Ninth." As nationwide appellate
caseloads continue to grow, the logic of "what's one more circuit" has no
logical stopping point: other circuits would be split and re-split ad
infinitum. At the moment, there is a court charged with maintaining
consistency within the Pacific Rim jurisdictions. Even those who believe
the Ninth Circuit could do a better job of achieving uniformity ought not
lightly abandon that goal altogether.
B.

Legal Research in an Icebox

The only thing worse than legal research is legal research in a
jurisdiction with insufficient case law. The discovery that no binding
authority exists within the jurisdiction triggers the dreaded nationwide
search for persuasive out-of-jurisdiction authority. While some attorneys
may forego the effort, perhaps relishing the freedom to argue any
plausible interpretation they wish of the unconstrued law, their clients
would be better served if counsel could locate something in the way of
outside authority on which the wary judge could peg a favorable
decision.36 As a law clerk, I much preferred the one state search to the
fifty state search. Judges prefer it too, because it makes their own
research and decisionmaking much simpler.37 For clients, research in a
jurisdiction with a rich body of case law will cost less and produce a
higher level of confidence that the judge will agree with its results than
the multi-jurisdiction alternative. As a practitioner, I find Ninth Circuit
research a blessed relief because it is very likely to produce one or more
cases on point. If not, it will at least generate one case approximately on
point, creating a toehold from which further research may proceed. Even
if a new Twelfth Circuit were created that adopted the pre-split case law
of the Ninth Circuit (as the Eleventh Circuit did when it split from the
Fifth), areas where the new circuit's law was thinly developed would
soon appear as a result of new statutes or new legal theories.
The need for well-developed case law is especially important when
issues of first impression arise. Because of the size of the Ninth Circuit,
these cases tend to occur when Congress enacts a new statute or the bar
35. Id. at 891.
36. So much the better if one's outside authority can be dubbed "the majority view," "the
American rule," or "the modem approach."
37. Chief Judge Procter Hug has identified well-developed case law as a benefit of a large circuit.
See Testimony of Chief Judge Hug to the Commission (visited July 26, 1998) <http://app.
comm.uscourts.gov/hearingssanfran0529HUG.htm> [hereinafter Hug Testimony).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 73:957, 1998

develops a new legal theory, rather than from the random chance that a
given fact pattern has not occurred in the circuit before. Given the sheer
size of its population, and the fact that cases decided by any three-judge
panel become the law of the entire circuit,3" clients and counsel in the
Ninth Circuit currently have their questions of first impression decided
relatively quickly. By virtue of the proposed Twelfth Circuit's smaller
population, it might be years before an issue of first impression is
decided, leaving citizens in limbo in the meantime.
C.

Bigger CircuitsHave More Diverse Case Loads

The nickname "Icebox Circuit" should raise a red flag because it
suggests that the new circuit would be dominated by certain categories of
cases instead of the full gamut of litigation brought before federal courts
nationally. Following its split, the new Fifth Circuit (consisting of only
Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi) came to be known as "The Oil and
Gas Circuit."39 Even though that circuit has since diversified into oil, gas,
and lethal injections," a heavy diet of relatively few staples is unhealthy
for any court. The current Ninth Circuit decides an immense variety of
cases, including entertainment law from Los Angeles, computer and
biotechnology law from San Francisco and Seattle, mining and grazing
law from Montana and Idaho, territorial law from the Northern Marianas
and Guam, maritime law from the coastal states, water law from the
desert states, immigration law from the border states, and any criminal
law you could possibly imagine. It even hears cases involving oil, gas,
and lethal injections. 4' Its caseload cannot be pigeonholed; it is an
American circuit.
It would not benefit the citizens of the Northwest to turn their federal
court of appeals into a "Timber, Salmon, and Tribal Lands Circuit," as

38. See United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 327 (9th Cir. 1992).
39. See Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries-Why the Proposalto Divide the
United States Court ofAppealsfor the Ninth CircuitIs Not Such a Good Idea, 22 Ariz. St. L.J. 917,
926 (1990).
40. See Sam Howe Verhoek, Texas Wasting No Time with Executions: State on Schedule to Kill 8
Convicted Murderers this Month by Lethal Injection, Milwaukee J. & Sentinel, May 25, 1997,
availablein 1997 WL 4796215.
41. See, e.g., Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094, 1104 (9th Cir. 1997) (constitutionality of
lethal injection); White v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 945 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir. 1991) (validity of oil
and gas lease).
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some have suggested the Twelfth Circuit would become.42 The danger of
judges facing a comparatively unvaried case load is most readily
apparent for litigants whose cases fall outside the circuit's habitual
boundaries. Their panel might consist of judges who have never
encountered the area of the law before. As noted above, it may increase a
litigant's respect for a judge's rulings if the judge has had at least some
exposure to the litigant's general type of case. A judge with a few years
experience in the Ninth Circuit, with its fantastically diverse case load, is
more likely to have some prior experience with any given genus of cases
than ajudge of similar seniority in a smaller circuit.
Variations on this argument have been raised in favor of a circuit split,
as with the critics of the Ninth Circuit's Venetie decision who argued that
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act was poorly interpreted because
out-of-state judges deal with it irregularly.43 It is true that a northwest
circuit split might result in a body of judges more familiar with this
particular statute, but at the cost of reducing these judges' familiarity
with other areas of the law. Over the long run, there will be more areas of
the law in a smaller circuit in which the judges have had no previous
experience than there will be in a larger and more diverse circuit.
Redrawing circuit boundaries to ensure that a particular statute becomes
the circuit's bread and butter will inevitably shortchange litigants with
claims arising in other substantive areas, such as the Alaskan with an
intellectual property case who might benefit from a panel whose judges
have heard a few cases arising from the movie or recording industries in
California.
At the same time, a judge's familiarity with an area of the law reaches
a point of diminishing returns. For litigants presenting garden variety
appeals, the temptation for the judge who sees little else is to decide the
case on auto-pilot. I encountered this syndrome myself during a single
year as a judicial clerk. My last month on the court required me to write a
bench memo about a drug bust at an airport that seemed suspiciously
familiar to the drug bust at the train station I had seen during my second
month. So I cut and pasted--call it stare decisis. My attitude toward the
two cases differed starkly: the second one received enough thought and

42. My argument in this section-that a wider variety of cases results in better judging-does not
require that the Twelfth Circuit's case load be as limited as this nickname implies, or even that it be
less varied than found in other comparably sized circuits. What matters is whether it would be less
varied than the current Ninth, which would be true almost by definition.
43. See Spreng, supranote 4, at 933-35; see also Twelfth Court Warranted,supranote 13, at A-4.
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attention (I hope), but less than the first. I was less inclined to consult
the original record and more inclined to skim. I felt as if I already
knew the answer before doing the research. These are natural
tendencies, and even worthwhile ones when they contribute to
efficiency. But extended too far, they could result in bored and rote
judging. Upon his resignation, Judge Robert Bork was reported to
have cheered "Free at last!" at being released from the highly
technical regulatory cases that dominate the D.C. Circuit's case load.'
The bored judge does not give each case individualized attention, and
instead enforces blanket rules of thumb that only the most extreme
variation from standard fact patterns can outweigh: the arresting officer
did/did not have probable cause to arrest; the alleged trademark
infringement is/is not likely to cause consumer confusion; the
governmental interest in restricting speech is/is not compelling.
The quality of judging will improve if the judges routinely encounter a
greater variety of questions. Analogizing across doctrines is a standard
mode of judicial decisionmaking and a helpful cross-check that one is
reaching a sound decision. Lessons learned in death penalty cases help
judges understand assisted suicide cases,45 just as abortion cases inform
medical marijuana cases,46 and so on. It is not enough to nominate
broadminded, intellectually sharp judges. We must keep them that way
after they are confirmed. One method judges use to keep alert is to rotate
their law clerks, because one always learns by teaching. The combination
of a judge already up to speed on an issue plus a clerk struggling to get
there results in more knowledge than the judge would have alone.
Another institutional method to avoid judicial boredom is to ensure a
diverse case load, which a large circuit will likely accomplish simply by
virtue of its size.
For much the same reason, the reduced case load of the proposed
Icebox Circuit would result in fewer clerkship applications from law
schools outside the circuit. When my classmates and I applied for
clerkships, the Fifth Circuit's reputation as "The Oil and Gas Circuit"4 7
made it seem a less appealing place to work than the smorgasbord Ninth
Circuit. Correspondingly fewer of us applied to Fifth Circuit judges.
Those Ninth Circuit judges whose chambers are in cities that are rightly
44. Ruth Marcus, Robert Bork's Last Day on Bench a Busy One, Wash. Post, Feb. 6, 1988, at A3.
45. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2302 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring).
46. See Seeley v. State, 132 Wash. 2d 776, 940 P.2d 604 (1997).
47. See supranote 39 and accompanying text.
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or wrongly perceived as unglamorous-Fairbanks, Boise, Billings,
Reno-benefit in the hiring process by offering applicants the chance to
clerk on the nation's largest circuit. Without that draw, the judges of the
proposed Twelfth Circuit will likely receive fewer applications from
those law students who are most sought after, such as editors of major
law reviews. Note that I say "sought after" rather than "qualified." There
are more than enough qualified law school graduates every year to fill
the three or four clerkships allotted to each judge, which should make the
absence from the applicant pool of a few law review editors48 a minor
point-but perhaps it is not to the judges in the Twelfth Circuit.
III. A NINTH CIRCUIT SPLIT WOULD NOT BRING THE
PROMISED BENEFITS
Part II of this Article sang the praises of larger circuits assuming all
things being equal. This Part examines whether things would be equal as
regards judicial workload, collegiality, and other selected topics. In my
view, many of the problems perceived by Spreng or other proponents of
splitting the Ninth Circuit either do not exist (as with the "cocoon
problem") or would not be affected by a circuit split if they did (as with
the reversal rate of the current Ninth Circuit judges by the current
Supreme Court justices).49 Splitting the circuit is no better as a remedy
for the circuit's current or future problems than cannibalism was a
remedy for overpopulation on the British Isles."0
A.

Workload

I agree with Spreng that reducing the workload per judge would lead
to more reflection, more precise writing, and a better rested judiciary, all
of which are beneficial. 5' I also agree with her that splitting the circuit
would not, by itself, have any impact on the number of regularly
calendared cases per judge, but that it could reduce the number of hours

48. Oddly enough, some of them compete to recruit these misguided souls, despite the warped
priorities the credential signifies. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, Confessions ofa BadApple, 100 Yale L.J.
1707, 1708 (1991); Patricia M. Wald, SelectingLaw Clerks, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 152, 154-55 (1990).
49. See, e.g., Spreng, supranote 4, at 899-900,924-27.
50. See Jonathan Swift, A Modest Proposalfor Preventing the Children of Poor Peoplefrom
Being a Burthen to Their Parents of the County, andfor Making Them Beneficial to the Publick
(weaver Bickerton 1730).
51. Spreng, supra note 4, at 893-95.
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spent on en banc activity. 2 We differ, however, on whether reducing en
bane activity as the method for reducing total workload is either needed
or desirable.
Spreng's estimate that each judge and each clerk spends ten hours per
week on en bane matters strikes me as drastically overstated. 3 Judges
have a great deal of control over the time spent on en bane matters. The
process begins when a three-judge panel issues an opinion.5 4 At this
stage, some judges review each published decision, in part to familiarize
themselves with the circuit's law, and in part to identify opinions that
might merit en bane review. Once a judge of the circuit decides to call
for a vote on whether to take a case en bane-either sua sponte or, as is
more typical, at the suggestion of the losing party-the en bane
coordinator asks the prevailing party to submit a brief.5 Once that brief
is received, the interested judges have a fixed period of time to send each
other e-mails debating the merits.56 These are ordinarily the judges
calling for the en bane vote and the author of the challenged opinion, but
all judges may express their thoughts. After the debate period, the judges
have a fixed period of time to cast their e-mail ballots.57
A judge who fears "drowning in en bancs"58 has many techniques
available at each stage of the process to minimize the workload
associated with them. Most judges ensure that either they or their clerks
review all the circuit's published opinions within thirty days, but judges
could legitimately choose not to, preferring instead to familiarize
themselves with the circuit's law on a topic when called upon to do so
through assigned cases. 9 No judge is required to call for an en bane vote,
either sua sponte or upon a party's suggestion, or to contribute to the
e-mail discussions once a vote is called. It is not very time consuming to
cast an informed vote: read the opinion, the parties' short briefs in favor
of and in opposition to en bane rehearing, and the string of e-mails from
colleagues on the subject, then vote yea or nay (abstention counts as a

52. Id.at Part II.A.3.
53. Id.at 898.
54. For process, see generally Fed. R. App. P. 35.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Fed. R.App. P. 35; 9th Cir. R.35-I to 35-3 (including Circuit Advisory Committee Notes).
See supra note 55.
See supra note 55.
Spreng, supra note 4, at Part III.A.3.

59. See Testimony ofFormer ChiefJudge Alfred T. Goodwin to the Commission (May 27, 1998)
(visited July 14, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/seattle/0527GOO0.htm>.
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nay)." No written explanation for one's vote is required, nor is one
allowed in the balloting itself. If one's personal threshold for finding a
case en bane worthy is sufficiently high (or low), the decision could be
made with little soul searching or additional research. At the extrene,
taking senior status removes one from the obligation to cast en bane
votes entirely.6 Some judges have chosen to go senior earlier or later in
their careers depending largely on how much they enjoy en bane activity.
A conscientious judge might object that shortcuts like these are an
unsuitable response to an oversized workload, and depending on one's
views of what constitutes the judge's duty, the criticism may be justified.
It would be best if all judges' schedules permitted them to remain fully
engaged with all aspects of the en bane process (if desired) as well as
with all aspects of deciding calendared cases. But which part of a judge's
workload should be pruned to reach this condition? Spreng would reduce
the en bane workload per judge by splitting the circuit. Because en bane
activity is good for the court, I would reduce the non-en bane workload.62
As Spreng notes, the en bane mechanism creates a healthy incentive
for judges to write decisions that accurately state the law, avoid
provocative dicta, and do not push the facts of a case into the service of
legal theories they cannot support.63 The chief benefits of en bane
activity are those advertised: ensuring uniformity of law within the
circuit and, wherever possible, with decisions of other circuits.' The
controversy, if any, arises over the remaining category of cases suitable
60. Fed. R. App. P. 35(a) (stating that en bane requires majority of active judges, rather than
majority ofjudges voting).
61. Fed. R. App. P. 35(a) (noting that en bane decision rests on vote of majority of judges "who
are in regular active service").
62. The Commission appears to agree that en bane activity is desirable in and of itself, citing the
likelihood that more cases would be reheard en bane as a major benefit of its proposal. Tentative
DraftReport, supranote 6, at 27, 43-44.
Splitting the circuit would have the adverse result of increasing the total number of hours judges
spend on administrative tasks other than judging. Two circuits require two chiefjudges, two en bane
coordinators, two death penalty coordinators, and two organizers of judicial conferences and law
clerk orientation. Spreng correctly notes that each of these jobs is somewhat more time consuming in
the Ninth Circuit than it would be in either a post-split Ninth or Twelfth, but the total number of
hours spent by post-split judges on these non-judicial chores would be greatly increased, perhaps
doubled. See Spreng, supra note 4, at 904-05. The economies of scale are easiest to see for
conference organizing. The hard part is setting the agenda and lining up the speakers. The number of
conference attendees is largely irrelevant. The types of work that increase with numbers (plane
reservations, meals, and so on) are likely to be delegated to staff in any event.
63. Spreng, supranote 4, at 898-99.
64. Fed. P. App. P. 35(a)(1); 9th Cir. R. 35-1.
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for en banc review-where the issue is just too important and the panel
opinion is just too wrong.65 The decision to call for an en bane vote in
these cases is necessarily subjective, causing some judges and observers
to complain that off-panel judges call for votes on such cases too
frequently. It would be a bigger concern if too few worthy cases were
subject to en banc calls rather than too many. Because cases in this
category do not create different rules of law between circuits, the
Supreme Court is disinclined to grant certiorari. It is simple enough for a
judge who believes an en bane call is superfluous to stay out of the email fray and then vote no when the time comes. This pattern, if used by
enough judges, will raise the bar for en bane calls generally. Whatever
one thinks is the optimum number of en bane calls, the decision should
not be unduly influenced by the effect rehearing would have on personal
workload. Reducing the number of calendared cases per judge would
reduce the incentive against taking cases en banc overwork can create.
To these benefits of en bane review identified by court rule,66 I would
add another: the en bane process is the best part of the job. As Chief
Judge Hug has testified, "I have found the careful preparation, the
discussion, and the insightful analysis of the judges on the en bane court
to be some of the most stimulating and inspiring work our court does."'67
The same goes for the decision to take cases en bane. Just as a diverse
case load keeps judges engaged, so does the heightened discourse that
occurs in the en bane process. For the judges that participate or observe,
the debates exercise the mind and get the juices flowing. They force the
judges to examine first principles and remember why they wanted to be
lawyers and judges initially. The confidential e-mail exchanges allow
judges to write and think in ways their published opinions do not. En
bane debates are an occasion to test theories, explore consequences, and
ruminate on the judge's role in the constitutional system. Spreng laments
that judges have insufficient opportunity to get to know each other,6" but
to reduce en bane activity is to reduce the occasion where such
interaction happens the most.

65. Fed. R. App. P. 35(a)(2).
66. Fed. R.App. P. 35; 9th Cir. R. 35-I.
67. Hug Testimony, supranote 37.
68. Spreng, supranote 4, at 923-24.
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B.

Collegiality

Spreng acknowledges that the current crop of Ninth Circuit judges are
"remarkably charming," devoted to their work, and genuinely interested
in making the court a pleasant place to work.69 She also examines
selected opinions that she says are not examples of a lack of
collegiality." Allow me, then, to state the logical conclusion: there is no
"collegiality problem" in the Ninth Circuit, and certainly not one that has
anything to do with size. During my tenure, the judges of the circuit
treated each other as well as any twenty-eight unrelated adults one could
imagine (and perhaps a little better than twenty-eight related ones). It
appeared to me that, for the most part, the judges of the circuit genuinely
liked and respected each other. If that was not the case, they hid it well.
This is no happy accident. The judicial selection process and life
tenure are structural features that contribute to the court's overall
collegial relations. The role of life tenure in fostering collegial relations
is fairly obvious. Appellate court judges are chained to each for the
remainder of their professional lives, and quite frequently their natural
ones. A rational judge will therefore not dish out worse treatment than he
or she is willing to receive. There is a subjective element in this of
course: the thick-skinned judge is more willing to act antagonistically
than the thin-skinned one, but this would be the case even on a circuit
with as few as two judges. On the rare occasions I saw where an internal
court communication seemed too personal for comfort, one or more
judges (ordinarily those outside the center of the dispute) would send emails reminding their colleagues that they were, after all, still friends
who owed it to each other to check their adversarial impulses. These
mollifying messages tended to be the last word in the exchange. This
suggests that the base line is one of collegiality rather than its opposite; if
the judges did not value their friendships, there would be no point in
sending such messages.
It is true (as Spreng suggests in her discussion of "face time")7' that
the frequency with which one meets a colleague may affect the
interpersonal dynamic for the better, in part because it hastens the day of

69. Id. at 924.
70. Id. at text accompanying n.177.
71. Id. at 922-24.
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payback for uncollegial behavior.72 Before adopting a circuit split to
accomplish this end, however, one might ask whether a twenty-eight
member, life-tenured court contains too many personalities to treat as
colleagues. It takes a very dour view of human nature to suppose that a
group this size is destined to act uncollegially. For federal judges, the
nomination process selects personality traits that virtually guarantee this
will not be the case.
One of my favorite questions for judges was how they got their jobs.
Many were former litigators, some former business attorneys, and others
former judges, members of Congress, or executive branch officials.
Despite their differences, one overriding similarity revealed itself
whenever the discussion turned to the mechanics of securing the
nomination: they were all better than average politicians. Many had been
directly involved in politics as office holders or party executives. Many
were friends with senators, governors, or presidents, or at least could get
these people to return their calls. Even those who claimed they had been
plucked from obscurity on the strength of their intellect and judicial
temperament had done what was necessary to cultivate a reputation for
intellect and judicial temperament. At the very least, they knew how to
interview well in front of the Justice Department (which is known to ask
references whether a judicial candidate is too obnoxious to inflict on lifetenured colleagues), the President, and the Senate. You don't get to be a
federal judge without being an operator.
People like these are quite able to work a room of twenty-eight. When
they were lawyers, these judges routinely maneuvered among a much
larger population of law firm colleagues, opposing counsel, members of
bar committees, clients, potential clients, judges, and so on. When they
were professors, they mastered faculty politics within their universities
and with colleagues in their disciplines from other universities, and
taught hundreds if not thousands of students. Given the sheer number of
people with whom the judges ably worked before joining the bench, it is
a piece of cake for them to learn and adapt to their colleagues'
72. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 129 (1984). Axelrod argues that cooperation
will be fostered in a system that "increases the shadow of the future," and one way this can occur is
by making interactions among the parties more durable or more frequent, Id. Life tenure is as durable
as it gets since the likelihood of running into a given judge someday before you retire is very high.
The best way to increase the frequency for judicial contact, especially social contact, would be to
reinstitute the court rule requiring Ninth Circuit judges to maintain their chambers in the same city.
The current proposals for splitting the Ninth Circuit (including Spreng's, see Spreng, supra note 4, at
Part lI.B.5) do not require this-a serious omission if collegiality is the goal.
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personalities. (Even the clerks got pretty good at it, and we were only
there a year.) There is an added incentive for judges to do so: they deeply
value their audience of fellow judges, for they are each others' best and
sometimes only substitute for the many and varied community ties they
had to restrict upon taking the bench. They would be lonely in a smaller
court.73 In testimony before the Commission on Structural Alternatives,
former Chief Judge Browning recalled the reason for ending an earlier
experiment establishing northern and southern regional units within the
Ninth Circuit: the judges felt that the arrangement interfered with
established working relationships and offered less opportunity for
interaction and consideration of a wide range of cases. One judge noted
that the experiment created a "pervasive feeling that collegiality on the
court was fast being dissipated."'74
The role of e-mail in fostering collegiality should not be overlooked.
Because judges' chambers are not centralized (and would not be under
the proposed split), much judicial communication is electronic. Drafts of
opinions, and comments upon them, are circulated within three-judge
panels on the court's internal network. So are the courtwide debates on
en bane rehearing and occasionally musings on topics of general interest.
While no one would mistake these e-mails for the jokes, gripes, and Top
Ten lists other office workers exchange, the Ninth Circuit
e-mails allow judges a respite from the formal judicial voice. They can
be extremely revealing of their authors' personalities. Following some of
these written conversations as a clerk, it was easy to see who favored the
scholarly argument, who was concerned about the impact a decision
would have on trial courts, who knew how to tell a good story, and who
was inscrutable. E-mail communication is a vital link in a decentralized
court and facilitates collegial relations.
What of the examples Spreng offers of Ninth Circuit opinions
brimming with bitterness, invective, and dirty laundry?75 To begin with,
most judges of the Ninth Circuit used to be practicing lawyers, a
profession where no matter what you say or do, someone else is being
73. Although the need for contact among a decent-sized group of peers was not a stated basis for
her testimony opposing a circuit split, Judge Schroeder's comment is consistent with it: "Before
joining the Circuit Court, I was a Judge on the Arizona Court of Appeals for Division I, which at that
time had nine judges. I treasure the relationships I had there, but I have no desire to return to a small
appellate court." Testimony of Judge Mary M. Schroederto the Commission (visited July 26, 1998)
<http:/app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/sanfran/0529SCHR.htm>.
74. Testimony ofJames R. Browning,supra note 2.
75. See Spreng, supranote 4, at 913-22.
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paid to disagree with you. 76 Years of exposure to this breeds a high
tolerance for disagreement. The language in the cited cases is positively
courtly compared to the exchanges attorneys are accustomed to hearing
in negotiations, depositions, and court. Judicial canons of respect for
litigants also make it preferable for a judge to direct criticism to other
judges rather than to the parties. Readers of these opinions should not
confuse strongly held opinions about the law for personal dislike.
Furthermore, the cases Spreng cites are isolated exceptions to the
typical Ninth Circuit decision, which would be a unanimous ruling of
a three judge panel. Even more important is the strong emotional
content of the cases: assisted suicide, affirmative action, and the death
penalty." The cases Spreng cites may prove little other than the old
saying that hard cases make bad law. At the same time, we may take
some pride that the judges ruling on these issues care so obviously and
deeply about reaching the right results for the right reasons (although
they differ on what those might be). It would be a greater problem if
the judges of the Ninth Circuit did not express strong views on these
topics. Neurologist Antonio Damasio argues that because the regions
of the brain responsible for reasoning appear to be the same regions
that generate emotions, it is impossible to reason properly in the
absence of emotions.7 8 Only a disconnected judiciary could approach
these cases without some emotional reaction. I would even argue that
a judiciary that remained wholly dispassionate in the face of these
disputes ought not be trusted, because it plainly has trouble telling
abstraction from reality.
Finally, assume that I am wrong; assume an irreconcilable rift has
arisen among the Ninth Circuit judges; and, that this has impaired their
decisionmaking. A circuit split would not help matters. If Spreng
witnessed uncollegial behavior during her clerkship, it could not have
resulted from the size of the circuit. During my clerkship year the court
had its full complement of twenty-eight active judges and no collegiality
problem, contrasted with eighteen judges during her supposedly fractious
clerkship year.79 Rancor has at times been reported within appellate

76. Joke stolen from Professor David Kairys, Temple University School of Law.
77. Spreng, supranote 4, at 913-21.
78. Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes'Error:Emotion,Reason, and the Human Brain (1994).
79. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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courts with as few as nine or twelve members.8" I have no idea why the
instigator judges on these courts choose to foul their nests, but because it
sometimes happens, their unlucky colleagues would be wise to wish for a
larger court. It is easier to get along with someone you can't stand if you
don't have to do it too often.
C.

Mini-legislature

The accusation of "legislating from the bench" has become a common
term of abuse. I do not see this as a problem in the Ninth Circuit, where
virtually every judge has at least once-either with regret or with gleewritten words to the effect that "this argument is better addressed to the
legislature." Instead of the standard charge that judges are usurping the
legislative policymaking role, Spreng contends that the inner mindset of
judges on large courts improperly mirrors that of legislators. 8' The
problem, Spreng says, is that because the court is so big, judges see
themselves as autonomous actors with no obligation to reason with their
colleagues." As a result, she argues that judges resort instead to
legislative behavior like horse trading, bloc voting, and publication of
too many unnecessary dissenting or concurring opinions.83
I have a number of objections to this as a description of the Ninth
Circuit. The epistemological objection: only judges are allowed to
observe conferences after oral argument where the judges first debate
and decide cases, so it is unclear how anyone-including a law clerkcould have observed supposedly legislative behavior occurring there.
The historical objection: the tradition of the published judicial dissent
predates that of the congressional minority report, which suggests that
legislators issuing them are acting judicially, not that judges issuing
dissents are acting legislatively. The constitutional objection: the Article
III case or controversy requirement forces judges to act locally while
thinking globally, reducing their ability to issue quasi-legislative edicts

SO. The twelve-member D.C. Circuit has been the site of numerous famous personality clashes,
including one that reputedly degenerated into threats of physical violence. See Neil Lewis, Presiding
as Ideas Clash in Capital Appeals Court, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1991, at B4. The nine-member
Supreme Court of Washington has-recently been criticized for "sarcasm"e and "backbiting" among its
members. Neil Modie, Effectiveness of Volatile State High Court a Matter of Opinion, Seattle PostIntelligencer, Aug. 31, 1998, at Al.
81. Spreng, supranote 4, at 927-32.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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even if they wanted to. The pragmatic objection: neither Spreng nor
those she cites describe any cases where the alleged legislative mindset
either did or could result in incorrect or poorly reasoned opinions.
Even if one accepted the description of the Ninth Circuit as a minilegislature, a circuit split would have no influence on these supposed
legislative tendencies. The vast majority of Ninth Circuit cases are
decided in panels of three, and this would remain the case in the new
Twelfth Circuit. The limited en banc procedure reduces the number of
Ninth Circuit judges deliberating on a single en banc appeal to
eleven.84 Apart from the court rulemaking process,8" the only time
where Ninth Circuit judges act in a group large enough to be called a
mini-legislature is when they vote whether to take a case en banc," 6 a
decision that in and of itself has no precedential value.87 Even
Thompson v. Calderon, which publicly discussed the circumstances
surrounding a vote to take a case en banc, was decided by an elevenjudge panel after the vote was over.8 If twenty-eight judges form a
mini-legislature, it doesn't convene very often.
At the same time, those having a legislative mindset would have
ample opportunity to exercise it on a much smaller court, so splitting the
Ninth Circuit is no cure. Three judges is all it takes to create such
familiar political dynamics as the swing vote or the alliance. Only each
judge's individual integrity prevents the deciding vote in a two-one
decision from being cast on unsavory grounds like repaying a favor or
storing one for the future. If the problem exists on a three-judge panel, it
could certainly infect the dynamics of any court larger than that,
including the proposed Twelfth Circuit. Indeed, many of the supposed
symptoms of a mini-legislature can be found on nine-member courts.
There is no way for the non-clairvoyant to know, but Spreng's
description of the judge who elects not to reason but instead simply casts
lots with another judge of similar views89 could be said to apply to the
strongly correlated votes of Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and

84. 9th Cir. R. 35-3.
85. Fed. R. App. P. 47.
86. Fed. R. App. P. 35.
87. 9th Cir. R. 36-1, 36-3.
88. See 120 F.3d 1045, 1048-51 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 1489 (1998).
89. Spreng, supranote 4, at 931.
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Clarence Thomas." The nine-member Supreme Court of Washington has
been criticized for publishing too many separate opinions, a supposed
symptom of excessive size. 91 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court is
known to engage in just the sort of dealmaking that Spreng decries, most
famously in Brown v. Board of Education, where Chief Justice Warren
changed, added, or subtracted language in the opinion to secure a
unanimous ruling.92
The objection that appellate judges ought not make deals runs counter
to the collegial ideal, which facilitates "the mutual accommodations that
underlie sound judicial decisions."'93 The principled reason for allowing
courts of appeals to reverse trial courts comes not from the fact that
appellate judges are smarter, but that they sit in groups of three or more
94
where their decisions may benefit from debate and, yes, compromise.
As Justice Souter has said, "judges are supposed to influence each other,
and they do." 95 Any outside observer would be hard pressed to
distinguish the desirable situation of judges reasoning with each other
from the undesirable situation of judges bargaining with each other.
D.

Predictabilityand Reckonability

I reject the critics' premise that the Ninth Circuit is materially harder
to predict than any other intermediate court of appeals, and the related
suggestion that two smaller circuits would necessarily be more
"reckonable." 96 My main disagreement is with the assumption that any
case decided by a judge other than oneself could ever be predictable. 97 If
it exists, the truly predictable case will settle before trial. This means that
by definition, the only cases a court of appeals ever hears are those where
the parties were unable to jointly reckon what the jury or the trial judge
90. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, The Supreme Court's Balance ofPower, Wash. Post, July 3, 1997,
at A17.
91. Modie, supra note 80 (noting that earlier courts "didn't have this phenomenon of everyone
wanting their particular point of view being set out").
92. Joseph Goldstein. The Intelligible Constitution57-80 (1992).
93. Spreng, supra note 4, at 921 (quoting Judge Wilkinson).
94. See. e.g., United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
95. Calderon v. Thompson, 118S. Ct. 1489, 1508 (1998) (Souter, J.. dissenting).
96. Spreng, supra note 4, at 909.
97. Trial court judges often behave in ways litigators cannot fathom. The fact that parties and their
counsel are frequently unable to successfully predict the actions of a trial judge (sitting on a panel of
one) calls into question Judge Tjoflat's statement that "[i]f you have three judges on a court of
appeals, the law is stable." Spreng, supra note 4, at 906 (quoting Judge Tjoflat).
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would do with the case. Furthermore, because intermediate courts of
appeals are constrained to follow Supreme Court precedent, they are
infinitely easier to predict than a high court that has the luxury of
reversing itself in the ordinary course of business.98
Various witnesses have cited to the Commission the studies showing
that no more internal inconsistencies exist within Ninth Circuit law than
any other circuit. 9 It is useful to ask in this regard what sort of cases one
is trying to predict: those that require clarification of a legal rule, or fact
specific cases that hinge on the application of law to facts. In my
experience, the Ninth Circuit is positively scrupulous about keeping its
rules clear, and it acts speedily to correct irreconcilable statements of law
on the rare occasions where they appear. For example, my clerkship year
saw a three-judge panel request en banc hearing sua sponte when they
discovered prior to oral argument that two conflicting lines of decision
had crept into existence as to whether bank robbery was a per se crime of
"dishonesty" within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence
609(a)(2).' The en banc call passed, and the rule for the circuit was
established with little fuss by a unanimous eleven-judge panel.'' Both
parties, meanwhile, had opposed rehearing en banc, arguing instead that
their preferred line of cases was controlling. The court did not adopt this
expedient.
The harder cases-even when presented to single judges-are those
where the legal test is fact specific by design. Numerous multi-factor
balancing tests occur where bright line tests would not be sufficiently
sensitive to the variety of human experience. For cases of this sort, it
means little to say that two decisions are "in conflict" if they agree on the
applicable legal standards."2 In any event, predicting the result of such a

98. See, e.g., Jerome Farris, The Ninth Circuit-MostMaligned Circuit in the Country-Factor
Fiction?,58 Ohio St. L.J. 1465, 1469 (1997).
99. See, e.g., Federal Judicial Center, Structuraland OtherAlternativesfor the FederalCourts of
Appeals 93-95 (1993); Arthur D. Hellman, Maintaining Consistency in the Law of the Large
Circuit, in RestructuringJustice 86 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990). Elsewhere, Hellman argues with
some justification that the decisions of a circuit with well-developed case law will be easier to
predict than one with sparse case law, once again making the larger circuit the preferable one. Arthur
D. Hellman, Breaking the Banc: The Common Law Process in the Large Appellate Court, 23 Ariz.
St. L.J. 915,981-82 (1991).
100. See United States v. Brackeen, 969 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1992) (en bane).
101. Id.
102. Arthur D. Hellman, Dividing the Ninth Circuit: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come, 57
Mont. L. Rev. 261,280 (1996).
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case is fairly easy on appeal: the standard of review will ordinarily mean
that the panel will affirm. 3
It may be true that "outlier" judges predisposed to haul the law
towards their edges of the bell curve are an enemy of predictability."°
However, I question whether they will have any less effect on a small
circuit. The opportunity to act on one's outlier opinions will arise less
often in a circuit with more judges. A Ninth Circuit judge who wishes,
for example, to greatly restrict the application of Roe v. Wade within the
circuit might not be drawn for the panel that hears the case presenting the
issue. If this judge's views are truly outlying, his or her call for en bane
rehearing of the decision of the panel that did decide the case will not
attract a majority. On a smaller circuit where each judge hears a larger
proportion of the court's total case load, the outlier judge is more likely
be assigned platform for atypical views. In addition, it takes at most two
judges on a panel to create an outlier opinion, and that two-judge
majority might consist of only one true outlier judge, joined by another
who is convinced to go along for the ride. Similarly, the outlier judge in
a small circuit needs to win fewer converts to take a case en bane or form
a majority once there.
Spreng suggests that Ninth Circuit panels are "structurally prone to
becoming independent operators because of weak institutional
constraints."'0 5 It is difficult to see what extra constraints would be
created by splitting the circuit. All federal circuit judges face the same
limits to their authority: two judges on the panel can form a majority and
force the outlier into dissent; the remaining active judges can take the
case en bane if the outlier finds an ally; the Supreme Court can reverse;
and, if the outlier judge engages in high crimes and misdemeanors,
Congress can impeach. The same constraints would remain in a divided
circuit, with the only difference being the substitution of a full en bane
for the limited en bane panel.
The composition of the en bane panel appears to be the extra
constraint Spreng seeks, but it would only have an effect if the decisions
of limited en bane panels were accorded less respect than full court en

103. At a brown bag lunch held during my clerkship year, Justice Kennedy pointed out that Ninth
Circuit opinions tend to belabor standards of review, but perhaps there is good reason.
104. Spreng, supra note 4, at 909-11.
105. Id. at911.
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bane decisions.1 1 6 I have no comparable experience as a clerk on other
circuits, but it is hard to imagine any other court holding its full court en
bane decisions in higher esteem than the Ninth Circuit holds its limited
en bane decisions. The rule of thumb for drafting opinions was to always
cite en bane cases where possible, because they connote extra weight. En
bane decisions were less likely than three-judge panel decisions to be
treated as if they were limited to their facts. Judge's e-mails contained
frequent statements along the lines of: "we went to the trouble of taking
that issue en bane in Smith v. Jones, and I'm not about to reopen it here."
Spreng's assertion that a Ninth Circuit en bane is a mere "expanded
panel" contradicts my personal experience." 7 It also has little meaning as
a proposition of law, because the decision of any panel, even a limited
one, is binding authority for the entire circuit."0
E.

GeographicalPolarization

Judicial biographies are not persuasive evidence of an underlying
incompatibility between the northern and southern portions of the Ninth
Circuit. 9 Spreng observes that the current active judges from northwest
states are, to her tastes, a more well-rounded selection than their
counterparts from the south."0 She concludes that they will continue to
be so in the future, on the express assumption that these eight people are
representative of the pool of potential judges from the northwest
generally."' These are big extrapolations from tiny samples. While I
share Spreng's belief that the bench should be diverse in terms of life
experiences as well as demographics, splitting the circuit would not
effect that goal. As with law clerks, the number of qualified judicial
candidates far exceeds the number of available positions. Whatever one's
standards, it would be very easy for the President and Senate to fill a
newly split Twelfth Circuit with nothing but lousy judges. It would be
equally possible to fill an unsplit Ninth Circuit with excellent ones, even
if it were to grow to twice its current size.
106. Id. The Commission's tentative draft report also intimates disapproval of the limited en bane
concept, although it stops short of linking dissatisfaction with Ninth Circuit en bane procedures to
the size of the limited en bane panel. Tentative DraftReport, supranote 6, at 43 & n.92.
107. Spreng, supra note 4, at 908.
108. See, e.g., United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322,327 (9th Cir. 1992).
109. Spreng, supra note 4, at 937-42.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 938-41.
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Leaving these difficulties aside, let us assume that the Pacific
Northwest and the rest of the Ninth Circuit do have distinct legal
cultures. If there are differences worth talking about, they will eventually
result in different rules of law-circuit splits-which the Supreme Court
will need to resolve, effectively squelching one rule or the other. This
makes splitting the circuit an ineffective mechanism for ensuring that the
supposedly different northwestern legal ethic becomes law. A larger
question is whether this is a valid goal at all in a system dedicated to the
enforcement of uniform federal law. If it were reasonable to argue that
non-Alaskan judges should not interpret a federal statute having
application in Alaska, then it would also mean that the ninety-eight nonAlaskan Senators and 434 non-Alaskan Representatives had no business
voting on the bill and the non-Alaskan President had no business signing
it into law."' "Geographical polarization" is a better argument for
seceding from the Union than it is for splitting the Ninth Circuit.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current debate over the structure of the Ninth Circuit comes when
the judiciary has been made a more visible topic for campaign rhetoric.
Denunciations of individual judges and individual decisions are on the
rise,"' as is the influence of campaign money in state judicial
elections." 4 What is surprising is that attacks on federal judges have not
been more common over time, because judges make such perfect targets.
They are already guaranteed to have angered the losing half of the
litigants who have appeared before them. Canons of judicial conduct
make judges disinclined to defend themselves. Because removing judges
from office is difficult, the voters are unlikely to blame a candidate for
not making much headway against the judicial menace. As long as the
candidate does not do anything rash (like impeach), federal judges will
remain available for further demonization in elections to come.

112. Id. at 932-36.
113. U.S. District Judge Robert Baer was lambasted during the 1996 presidential election for a
ruling on a routine motion to suppress. See Patricia Hurtado, Judges Back Baer: Unusual Move Over
Drug Case Handling, Newsday, Mar. 29, 1996, at A27. Judge H. Lee Sarokin of the Third Circuit
resigned as a protest to the use ofjudicial decisions for electoral political purposes, but he has since
reportedly regretted the move. Rocco Cammarere, Sarokin Concedes QuittingBackfired, N.J. Law.,
Oct. 20, 1997, at 2501.
114. See Sheila Kaplan & Zoe Davidson, The Buying ofthe Bench, Nation, Jan. 26, 1998, at 11, 11.
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While the controversy over the size of the Ninth Circuit may be
motivated in part by concerns over its operations, resolving the
controversy will inevitably involve a choice about power. Splitting the
circuit will increase the "advise and consent" power of northwestern
senators who would be able to advise and consent with regard to a
greater proportion of the judges in their circuit." 5 Keeping the circuit
intact maintains the power of the Ninth Circuit's judges, who would
remain authorities for eleven jurisdictions instead of six or five. One
might approach the question by asking whether splitting the circuit
results in the best allocation of power between the court and the senate.
Although there is no reliable method to quantify power into readily
comparable units, swapping a large amount of existing judicial power for
a rather modest gain in senatorial advise and consent power is likely a
poor trade for the public as a whole. It would require that the judges
endure separation from friendships developed over decades, a less varied
case load, and membership in a less vigorous legal debating society.
These losses have adverse public impact because they impair
decisionmaking. The public interest is more aligned with the judiciary's
interest than the senate's. Of course, one hopes that Congress will make
its decision without reference to these considerations, instead focusing on
the empirical question the Commission is currently addressing: What
structure will provide the best justice?
This suggests a final reason to favor the views of the great majority of
Ninth Circuit judges rather than the views of some northwestern
senators." 6 Because they live in the court, judges are in a better position
to evaluate the matter. They are even better positioned than their clerks.
115. The best clue that a split would enhance senatorial power is that the bills to divide the Ninth
Circuit tend to arise in the Senate, rather than the House of Representatives. See Conrad Bums,
Dividing the Ninth Circuit CourtofAppeals: A ProcessLong Overdue, 57 Mont. L. Rev. 245, 24749, 253 (1996). If the court's operations were truly causing a problem of general importance to the
people of the circuit, the bills to remedy it could originate in either chamber.
116. The court as a whole submitted a statement to Congress opposing the split proposal in 1995.
See supra note 28. During the 1998 hearings, 10 active or senior status judges (including all the
current or former Chief Judges) testified in opposition to a split. See Statement of Judge Robert
Boochever to the Hearingsof the Commission on StructuralAlternativesfor the FederalCourts of
Appeals (visited July 26, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.govlhearings/seattle/0527BOOO.htm>;
Testimony of Former Chief Judge James R. Browning, supra note 2; Testimony of Former Chief
Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, supra note 59; Hug Testimony, supra note 37; Statement of Judge Mary
M. Schroeder to the Hearingsof the Commission on StructuralAlternativesfor the Federal Courts
of Appeals (visited July 26, 1998) <http:llapp.comm.uscourts.govhearingstsanfan/O529SCHR.
htm>; Statement of Judge Otto R. Skopil, Jr. to the Hearings of the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (visited July 26, 1998) <http://app.comm.
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uscourts.gov/hearingsseattle/0527SKOO.htm>; Statement of Judge Sidney R. Thomas to the
Hearings of the Commission on StructuralAlternativesfor the Federal Courts of Appeals (visited
July 26, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/seattle/0527TH0O.htm>; Testimony ofJudge
David R. Thompson Before the Hearings of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the
Federal Courts of Appeals (visited July 26, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/
sanfranf0529THOM.htm>; Testimony of Former Chief Judge J. Clifford Wallace Before the
Hearings of the Commission on StructuralAlternativesfor the Federal Courts of Appeals (visited
July 26, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/chicagolvallace.htm>; Statement of Judge
CharlesE. Wiggins to the Hearingsof the Commission on StructuralAlternativesfor the Federal
Courts of Appeals (visited July 26, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/sanfran
0529WIGG.htm>.
Three active or senior status judges testified in favor of a circuit split, although Judge O'Scannlain
cautioned against certain configurations. See Testimony of Judge Andrew J. Kleinfeld Before the
Hearings of the Commission on StructuralAlternativesfor the FederalCourts of Appeals (visited
July 26, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/submitted/KLEINFEL.htm>; Statement of
DiarmuidF. O'Scannlain to the Hearings of the Commission on StructuralAlternatives for the
FederalCourts ofAppeals (visited July 26, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/newyork/
OSCANNL.htm>; Statement of Judge Joseph T. Sneed III to the Hearingsof the Commission on
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (visited July 26, 1998)
<http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/sanfrarn0529SNEE.htm>.
In addition, a large majority of the active or senior status district court judges from
jurisdictions within the Ninth Circuit testifying opposed a split. See Submission by the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuitto the Commission on StructuralAlternatives
for the Federal Courts of Appeals (visited July 26, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/
hearings/sanfran/0529PERR.htm>; Statement of Judge William L. Dwyer to the Hearingsof the
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (W.D. Wash.)
(visited July 26, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/sanfran/0527DWYE.htm>;
Statement of Lloyd D. George to the Commission on StructuralAlternatives for the Federal
Courts of Appeals (visited July 26, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/sanfran/
0529GEOR.htm> (expressing views of judges of District of Nevada); Statement of ChiefJudge
Terry J. Hatter to the Hearings of the Commission on Structural Alternativesfor the Federal
Courts of Appeals, Jr. (C.D. Cal.) (visited July 26, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/
hearings/sanfran/0529HATT.htm>; Judge H. Russel Holland's Comments to the Commission
on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (visited July 26, 1998)
<http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/seattle/0527HOLL.htm>; Memorandum of ChiefJudge
Marilyn L. Huff to the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals (visited
July
26,
1998)
<http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/sanfran/
0529HUFF.htm>; Memorandum of Alan Kay to the Commission on StructuralAlternatives for
the FederalCourts ofAppeals (visited July 26, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/
sanfran/0529KAY.htm> (noting agreement of all judges of U.S. District Court for District of
Hawaii); Memorandum of Chief Bankruptcy Judge Geraldine Mund to the Commission on
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (visited July 26, 1998)
<http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/sanfran/0529MUND.htm>;
Statement of Judge
BarbaraJacobs Rothstein to the Commission on StructuralAlternativesfor the FederalCourts
of Appeals (visited July 26, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/seattle/
0527ROTH.htm>; Statement of Judge William W. Schwarzer to the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (visited July 26, 1998) <http://app.comm.
uscourts.gov/hearings/newyork/0424SCV.htm>; Statement of the United States Bankruptcy
Judgesfor the DistrictofArizona to the Commission on StructuralAlternativesfor the Federal
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Courts of Appeals (visited July 26, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/
sanfran/0529NIEL.htm>.
A smaller number of district court judges testified in favor of a circuit split. See Statement ofJudge
James Redden to the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals
(visited July 26, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.govhearings/seattle/0527REDD.htm> (speaking
for majority of judges in District of Oregon); Memorandum of Judge Fred Van Sickle to the
Commission on StructuralAlternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (visited July 26, 1998)
<http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/seattle[0527VANS.htm>.

